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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Oser filed a pro se Successive Application for Post Conviction Relief 
(hereinafter, Successive Petition) and Supporting Brief for Petition of Successive Post 
Conviction (hereinafter, Supporting Brief) 26 days after withdrawing the appeal of his 
initial post-conviction action. On two occasions, Mr. Oser requested that the district 
court appoint counsel to assist him in his Successive Petition. However, at the same 
time it granted the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, the district court denied 
Mr. Oser's request for counsel. Mr. Oser respectfully submits the district court's refusal 
to appoint counsel to assist him in the prosecution of his successive post-conviction 
case was in error. For the reasons set forth in detail below, Mr. Oser satisfied the 
standard for appointment of counsel under I.C. § 19-4904 because his pro se 
successive petition raised, at a minimum, the possibility of a valid claim thereby entitling 
him to appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 14, 2008, Mr. Oser was convicted of both trafficking in 
methamphetamine or amphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance. (R., p.3.) 
Mr. Oser's conviction and sentence was affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals. See 
State v. Oser, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 362 (Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2009); (R., p.4.). 
On July 20, 2009, Mr. Oser filed a timely pro se Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
(hereinafter, Petition) alleging his trial attorney, Paul Taber, was ineffective for failing to 
seek admission of audio tapes of the executed search warrant conducted upon his 
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residence. (R., pp.5, 8-11.) Mr. Oser was appointed counsel to assist him in his 
post-conviction action and appointed counsel, Teri Jones, filed an Amended Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief. (R., p.4.) In June of 2010, the district court entered an order 
granting the State's motion for summary judgment and Mr. Oser filed a timely appeal. 
(R., p.4.) On April 20, 2011, Mr. Oser withdrew his appeal from the district court's order 
granting the State's motion for summary judgment. (R., p.5.) 
On May 16, 2011, Mr. Oser filed a Successive Application for Post Conviction 
Relief (hereinafter, Successive Petition) and Supporting Brief for Petition of Successive 
Post Conviction (hereinafter, Supporting Brief). (R., pp.3-19.) In his Successive 
Petition, Mr. Oser asserted that his post-conviction counsel failed to do the following: 
(1) adequately address the ineffective assistance of counsel issues based on certain 
statements in the tape recordings; (2) raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for failing to impeach officers based on contradictions in the citations and trial testimony; 
and (3) raise the collateral issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call 
witnesses with direct knowledge of the statements made during the drug raid on his 
residence. (R., p.5.) AdditionaUy, Mr. Oser asserted that "there are mate-rial facts, not 
previously presented and heard, that require vacation of the convictions in the interest 
of Justice" because: (1) the affidavit of probable cause in support of search warrant 
obtained for Mr. Oser's residence either does not exist or was withheld from the 
defense; and (2) the affidavit of probable cause was obtained as a result of police 
misconduct, requiring suppression of evidence obtained during the search of Mr. Oser's 
residence. (R., p.5.) 
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Mr. Oser specifically requested the appointment of counsel to assist in his 
Successive Petition and asked "the court issue an Order for the appointment of an 
audio expert, at state expense, to enhance the specific statements petitioner seeks to 
have admitted from the tape recordings, more audible, if the court deems enhancement 
necessary." (R., p.6.) In his Supporting Brief, Mr. Oser asked that the district court take 
judicial notice of the audiotape recordings of the drug raid on his residence, which 
Mr. Oser asserts is part of the "court file" of his trial. (R., p.10.) Additionally, Mr. Oser 
attached a number of "exhibits" to his Successive Petition. (See R., pp.20-37.) 
Included within these exhibits was the Affidavit of Caroline Holly Mitchell. (R., p.31.) In 
her affidavit, Ms. Mitchell averred that she was present on the night of the drug raid on 
Mr. Oser's residence and had recently purchased a digital tape recorder for the purpose 
of determining whether Mr. Oser, her boyfriend at the time, had been cheating on her. 
(R., p.31.) Ms. Mitchell affirmed that prior to the officer's entry into the residence, she 
had turned it on to record the conversations between her, Mr. Oser, and two other men 
present that night, Cory Williams and James Johnson. (R., p.31.) Ms. Mitchell attested 
that the recorder was "stiU turned on a.mi hidden in the- ooucil" when "the Police broke 
down the door at Billy Oser's home." (R., p.31.) 
On June 27, 2011, Mr. Oser filed "Petitioner's Motion for Default Judgment" 
wherein he again requested counsel be appointed to assist him in his successive 
post-conviction action. (R., pp.39-41.) In response, the State filed an Answer to 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Motion to Dismiss Successive 
Petition. (R., pp.43-45, 47-49.) In its Motion to Dismiss Successive Petition, the State 
argued the claims relating to the affidavit that supported the search warrant were 
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untimely because they could have been raised in the first Petition and "Oser fails to 
state any reason why such claim [sic] was not raised earlier." (R., p.48.) Next, the 
State argued that "Oser specifies several instances of how his counsel in the prior post 
conviction proceeding was allegedly ineffective. Such claims are not cognizable under 
the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act." (R., p.48.) As a result, the State asked 
the district court to dismiss Mr. Oser's Successive Petition. (R., pp.48-49.) 
On July 11, 2011, the district court filed its Order Granting Motion to Dismiss 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.51-52.) With regard to 
Mr. Oser's requests for the appointment of counsel, the district court concluded: 
The Court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant if 
the successive petition for post conviction relief does not contain a 
cognizable claim for relief. In some cases, prose petitioners are untrained 
in the law and are inadequately prepared to present a cognizable claim. 
Such does not appear to be the case in the instant Successive Petition. 
The Petitioner articulately set forth his allegations. 
(R., p.51.) Next, in addressing the merits of Mr. Oser's Successive Petition, the Court 
stated: 
The Respondent's motion to dismiss the Petition is granted. The 
Successive Application for Post Conviction Relief is untimely and the 
claims and allegations set forth in the Successive Petition could have 
been raised in the Petitioner's previous Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
The Successive Application for Post Conviction Relief is hereby 
dismissed. 
(R., p.51.) Mr. Oser filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's Order 








The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Oser's Motion For Appointment Of Post 
Conviction Counsel Because His Pro Se Successive Petition For Post Conviction Relief 
Raised, At A Minimum, The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
A. Introduction 
In his pro se Successive Petition, Mr. Oser asked the district court to appoint 
counsel to assist him in the successive post-conviction action. Later, in his Motion for 
Default Judgment, Mr. Oser again requested that the district court appoint counsel to 
assist him. However, on the very day it granted the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal, it denied Mr. Oser's request for counsel. Mr. Oser respectfully submits the 
district court's refusal to appoint counsel to assist him in the prosecution of his 
Successive Petition was in error. For the reasons set forth in detail below, Mr. Oser 
satisfied the standard for appointment of counsel under LC. § 19-4904 in that his pro se 
successive petition raised the possibility of a valid claim thereby entitling him to 
appointed counsel. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1. Standard For Appointment Of Counsel 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction 
proceeding is governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in 
proceedings under the UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], 
a court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who is 
unable to pay the costs of representation. The decision to grant or deny a 
request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district 
court. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). 
In Charboneau, the Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petitioner is 
entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the trial court determines that the post-
6 
conviction proceeding is frivolous." Id. at 792 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
679 (2001 )). It further held a proceeding is not frivolous and, thus, counsel must be 
appointed if the petitioner "alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim .... " Id. 
at 793 (emphasis added). 
More recently, in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), the Supreme Court had 
occasion to revisit the standard for appointment of counsel in post-conviction cases. In 
that case, the Court reaffirmed the Charboneau standard: 
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid 
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the 
petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the 
record for possible non-frivolous claims," Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001), the court should appoint counsel if the facts 
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. The Swader Court also made it clear this standard is much 
lower than the standard for deciding petitions for post-conviction relief on their merits 
because, as had also been recognized in Charboneau, pro se petitioners generally 
cannot investigate or properly present their claims (regardless of whether those claims 
will ultimately be successful) without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 654-655. 
2. Standard Of Review 
"The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within 
the discretion of the district court." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. Indeed, since 
Charboneau was decided in 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued to describe 
the standard for appointment of counsel in discretionary terms. See, e.g., Eby v. State, 
148 Idaho 731,738 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,529 (2007). Presumably 
then, a district court's denial of a motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel 
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would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal. However, Mr. Oser contends 
the language of Charboneau, Workman, and Eby notwithstanding, the Idaho Supreme 
Court no longer treats the evaluation of a motion for appointment of post-conviction 
counsel as a discretionary decision and, therefore, the abuse of discretion standard 
cannot apply on appeal. 
The "possibility of a valid claim" standard that was coined in Charboneau, and 
reiterated in Swader, is a strictly legal standard that leaves no room for the district court 
to exercise any discretion. If there is the possibility of a valid claim (which is a purely 
legal question), the petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel; if there is no 
possibility of a valid claim (a purely legal question), the petitioner is not entitled to the 
appointment of counsel. This was made clear in Swader and Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 
339 (2009). 
Swader was the first Idaho Supreme Court case to interpret and apply 
Charboneau's "possibility of a valid claim" standard. In Swader, the district court had 
undeniably applied the wrong legal standard in denying the petitioner's motion for 
appointment of counsel. Rather than remanding the case for the district court to 
exercise its discretion in light of the correct standard, the Supreme Court applied the 
correct standard itself, determined that the petitioner-appellant had raised the possibility 
of a valid claim, reversed the district court's order denying counsel, and then remanded 
the case to the district court. Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-55. 
In Melton, the Court applied the same analysis to reach a different result. 
Although the Melton Court held the district court had erred in failing to consider the 
petitioner's motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel prior to summarily 
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dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief, it declined the petitioner's 
request to remand the case to the district court for an exercise of the district judge's 
discretion; instead, the Court found the error in failing to rule on the motion was 
essentially harmless because the petitioner's "successive petition for post-conviction 
relief did not raise the possibility of a valid claim." Melton, 148 Idaho at 342. 
In light of Swader and Melton, Mr. Oser contends the decision to appoint counsel 
in a post-conviction case is discretionary in name only1; he asserts it is really a strict 
question of law. As such, any decision by a district court to deny a post-conviction 
petitioner counsel must be reviewed de nova on appeal. See Castorena v. General 
1 In at least one other context the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that its "abuse 
of discretion" standard of review was somewl1at of a misnomer: 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural 
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for 
reversible error. 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge 
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances 
existing when th& mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
question must be whether the event which precipitated the 
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed 
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of 
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to 
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
When there has been a contemporaneous objection we determine 
factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct, then we determine 
whether the error was harmless. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007) (citations omitted). 
9 
Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 713 (201 O) ("This Court exercises free review over questions of 
law."). 
C. Because Mr. Oser's Successive Petition For Post Conviction Relief Raised, At A 
Minimum, The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 1 The District Court Erred In Failing To 
Appoint Counsel 
In seeking summary dismissal of Mr. Oser's Successive Petition, the State 
argued his claims relating to the affidavit that supported the search warrant were 
untimely because they could have been raised in the first Petition and "Oser fails to 
state any reason why such claim [sic] was not raised earlier."2 (R., p.48.) Additionally, 
the State argued that "Oser specifies several instances of how his counsel in the prior 
post-conviction proceeding was allegedly ineffective. Such claims are not cognizable 
under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act." (R., p.48.) 
In its Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Successive Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, the district court first found that Mr. Oser was not entitled counsel because his 
Successive Petition "does not contain a cognizable claim for relief." (R., pp.51-52.) In 
addressing the merits of Mr. Oser's Successive Petition, the Court stated, 
The Respondent's motion to dismiss the Petition is granted. The 
Successive Application for Post Conviction Relief is untimely and the 
claims and allegations set forth in the Successive Petition could have been 
raised in the Petitioner's previous Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The 
Successive Application for Post Conviction Relief is hereby dismissed. 
2 Based upon the allegations and argument made within Mr. Oser's pro se Successive 
Petition and the brief in support, appellate counsel does not dispute the prosecutor's 
assertion that Mr. Oser failed to offer any reason why the affidavit to the search warrant 
issue was missing in his previous Petition. However, that is not to say that with the 
assistance of counsel, Mr. Oser would be unable to provide the reasoning for not 
including that issue in his first Petition. As the Charboneau Court recognized, the 
appointment of counsel may be necessary "to give the petitioner an opportunity to 
properly allege the necessary supporting facts." 140 Idaho at 793. 
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(R., p.51.) 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (hereinafter UPC PA) provides that, 
generally, only one petition for post-conviction relief is allowed. I.C. § 19-4908. There 
is an exception, however, for situations in which there is "a ground for relief asserted [in 
a successive petition] which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." Id. Idaho's appellate 
courts have consistently held the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is just 
such a "sufficient reason" for the petitioner to raise, or re-raise, claims through 
successive petitions for post-conviction relief. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 
596 (1981); Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 670 (Ct. App. 2006); Griffin v. State, 
142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006); Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 420 (Ct. App. 
2005); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Here, where it was a successive post-conviction action for which Mr. Oser sought 
the assistance of counsel, Mr. Oser had two burdens to satisfy in order to be entitled the 
assistance he sought: first he had to demonstrate the possibility of a valid claim 
concerning the ineffecHve assistance of his trial counsel, 3 and second, he had to 
demonstrate the possibility of a valid claim concerning the ineffective assistance of the 
attorneys who handled his original post-conviction action.4 Mr. Oser has satisfied his 
burdens. 
3 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984). 
4 Because the Idaho Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted a standard for what 
constitutes ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel that would justify the filing 
of a successive petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Oser assumes that the Idaho 
courts would apply the same two-part test articulated in Strickland. 
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1. Mr. Oser's Successive Petition Was Timely Filed 
Although the UPCPA contains a general one-year statute of limitation, I.C. § 19-
4902, there is no time limit for filing a successive petition. I.C. § 19-4908; State v. 
Hernandez, 133 Idaho 794, 799, (Ct. App. 1999). The Hernandez Court determined 
that the one-year limitation period contained in Idaho Code Section 19-4902 is 
instructive in determining what is a "reasonable period of time" to file a successive post-
conviction petition. Id. The Hernandez Court did not hold there is a one-year time bar 
to successive petitions, but instead determined a year was a reasonable period of time 
to file a successive petition. Id. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Hernandez Court looked to I.C. § 19-4902. Id. 
Under Idaho Code section 19-4902(a), a person seeking relief under the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act must file a petition, "within one (1) year from the expiration of 
the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, 
whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). 
In Hernandez, the petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition. 133 Idaho at 
'i795. The district court gave notice of its intent to dismiss the post~conviciion petition 
because the application was based on conclusory allegations and did not state sufficient 
basis for relief. Id. at 795-796. The petitioner's attorney failed to respond to the court's 
notice, and thereafter, the district court dismissed the petition. Id. at 796. On March 13, 
1997, the dismissal of the petitioner's claims was affirmed on appeal. Id. On March 4, 
1998, the petitioner filed a successive petition claiming his post-conviction attorney 
failed to fully and fairly litigate the original post-conviction claims. Id. The district court 
dismissed the successive petition because it was time barred. Id. 
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On appeal, the petitioner argued he was entitled to one year from the Supreme 
Court's decision on appeal of the original post-conviction petition to file a successive 
petition. Id. The Hernandez Court recognized that there is no time limitation included in 
Idaho Code section 19-4908 and the time period in Idaho Code section 19-4902 is not 
renewed after the appeal from the original post-conviction relief. Id. at 799. However, 
the Court determined that the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate. Id. The 
Hernandez Court then examined whether the petitioner's successive petition was filed 
within a reasonable period of time, and found Idaho Code section 19-4902 instructive. 
Id. Because the petitioner filed his successive petition within one-year of the appellate 
court affirming the denial of his original post-conviction petition, the Hernandez Court 
held the petitioner had timely filed his successive petition. Id. 
Despite the district court's determination that Mr. Oser's Successive Petition was 
untimely filed, similar to Hernandez, because it was filed within a reasonable time of 
withdrawing the appeal from the summary dismissal of his initial post-conviction action, 
it is timely filed. (See R., pp.5, 51-52.) Upon discovering the inadequacies of his initial 
and Amended Petition, on AprH 20, 2011, Mr. Oser withdrew the appeal from the district 
court's order granting the State's motion for summary disposition of his post-conviction 
action. (R., p.5.) Thereafter, on May 16, 2011, Mr. Oser filed his Successive Petition 
and Supporting Brief, wherein he argued that the claims raised in his initial 
post-conviction action were inadequately litigated by his appointed post conviction 
counsel. (R., pp.3-19.) Accordingly, because Mr. Oser's Successive Petition was filed 
a mere 26 days after withdrawing the timely appeal of his initial post-conviction action, 
the district court erred in finding that his Successive Petition was untimely. 
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2. Mr. Oser Has Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim That His Initial Post 
Conviction Action Was Not Adequately Litigated By Appointed Counsel 
As is acknowledged above, a successive petition for post-conviction relief is 
properly filed where there is "a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was 
not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application." I.C. § 19-4908. Idaho appellate courts have consistently held the 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a "sufficient reason" for the petitioner 
to raise claims through successive petitions for post-conviction relief. See Palmer v. 
Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596 (1981) (holding that the ineffectiveness of prior post-
conviction counsel which causes certain allegations not to be raised would, if true, 
provide a basis to raise those allegations in a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief); Franck-Tee/ v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 670 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]e must conclude 
that the district court properly dismissed the three grounds which Franck-Teel's counsel 
represented Franck-Teel no longer wished to pursue. We note, however, that Franck-
Teel can still raise those three grounds for post-conviction relief in a successive post-
conviction relief action if she can show that she did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waive those grounds through her counsel at the hearing."); Griffin v. State, 
142 Idaho 438, 441 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[A]lthough a claim of ineffective post-conviction 
counsel, standing alone, is not grounds for post-conviction relief, an allegation that a 
claim was not adequately presented in the first post-conviction action due to the 
deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason to permit 
the claims to be presented again in a subsequent petition."); Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 
411, 420 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in 
the first post-conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction 
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counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately 
presented to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief."); 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that successive 
petitions are allowed not only where the ineffectiveness of prior post-conviction counsel 
causes issues not to be raised at all, but also where such ineffectiveness causes issues 
to be raised inadequately). 
Mr. Oser maintains that while the first three claims in his successive 
post-conviction were previously raised in his initial post conviction action, they were 
inadequately litigated by his appointed post conviction counsel. (R., p.5.) Specifically, 
Mr. Oser asserts his post-conviction counsel: (1) failed to adequately address the 
ineffective assistance of counsel issues based on certain statements in the tape 
recordings; (2) failed to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to 
impeach officers based on contradictions in the citations and trial testimony; and (3) 
failed to raise the collateral issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call 
witnesses with direct knowledge of the statements made during the drug raid on his 
residence. (R., p.5.) In his Supporting Brief; Mr. Oser clarified the error by his 
appointed counsel on each claim. (R., pp.10-17.) With regard to his claim about the 
audio recording of the drug raid, Mr. Oser wrote that appointed post-conviction counsel 
merely "parroted" what Mr. Oser was attempting to argue in his initial Petition, and failed 
to articulate the discrepancies between what the officers testified occurred during the 
raid, and what the audio would show actually happened, for impeachment purposes. 
(R., pp.10-13.) Likewise, Mr. Oser argued appointed post-conviction counsel failed to 
identify how the written citations and information in the police report contradicted and 
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conflicted with the police officers testimony about the raid. (R., pp.14-15.) Finally, 
Mr. Oser argued that his appointed counsel failed to articulate how trial counsel's failure 
to call certain witnesses might of affected the available defenses he had in his case. 
(R., pp.15-16.) 
Accordingly, Mr. Oser has raised the possibility of a valid claim his initial 
post-conviction action was inadequately litigated by his appointed post-conviction 
counsel, thereby justifying the instant Successive Petition to properly litigate his claims. 
3. Mr. Oser Has Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim That His Trial 
Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The district court must appoint counsel to assist a pro se petitioner if the 
post-conviction petition, liberally construed, raises the possibility of a valid issue. 
Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007). Although Mr. Oser's Successive Petition raises 
five separate claims, three of his claims, which were improperly litigated in the initial 
post-conviction action, present the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. In his 
Successive Petition, Mr. Oser asserts his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by faWing to: (1) introduce into evidence the audio recording of statements made by the 
parties during the officers' execution of the search warrant on his residence; (2) 
impeach the officers' testimony at trial with conflicting information contained in the police 
reports and citations issued against two individuals present in the residence at the time 
of the search; and (3) call witnesses with direct knowledge of the events occurring the 
nightofthesearch. (R., pp.5, 10-17.) 
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims arise from the Sixth Amendment's 
right to counsel guarantee. There is a two-pronged test for determining whether an 
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attorney has rendered ineffective assistance in contravention of a defendant's 
constitutional right to counsel. The threshold inquiry is whether counsel's performance 
was "deficient," i.e., whether it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," as 
judged "under prevailing professional norms." See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-91 (1984). Assuming there has been deficient performance, the next inquiry is 
whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687, 691-96. In 
order to establish "prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case" since the "result of a proceeding 
can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of 
counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the 
outcome." Id. at 693-94. Instead, it need only be shown "that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Id. at 694. 
In order to truly understand the importance of Mr. Oser's post-conviction claims, 
one must understand the circumstances of the execution of the search warrant and 
Mr. Oser's defense at trial. At the time the search warrant was executed on Mr. Oser's 
trailer, there were four individuals present inside: Mr. Oser, Caroline Holly Mitchell, Cory 
Williams, and James Johnson. (R., p.9.) When officers entered the residence, 
Mr. Oser was caught exiting through the back door, Ms. Mitchell was in the living 
room/kitchen area, and Mr. Williams and Mr. Johnson were in the office/bedroom area. 
(R., p.9.} Officers found methamphetamine in three places in the residence: a small 
amount was found in a plastic bag inside a purse that also contained a cell phone with 
the screen name "Holly"; methamphetamine was found in a large grey plastic box on top 
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of the microwave in the kitchen; and a large "ball" of methamphetamine (approximately 
28.73 grams) was found on the floor, underneath a computer desk. (R., p.9.) Mr. Oser 
was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine based upon the discovery of the large 
ball of metharnphetamine. (R., p.8.) While Mr. Oser admitted the metharnphetamine 
found on the microwave belonged to him, he specifically denied ownership of any of the 
other methamphetamine found in the residence. (R., pp.8-10.) In fact, it was Mr. Oser's 
position the large ball of methamphetamine belonged to Mr. Williams; Ms. Mitchell 
substantiated this claim at trial, testifying that Mr. Williams was in actual possession of 
the ball at the time the search warrant was executed. (R., pp.8-9.) 
At the very least, Mr. Oser raised the possibility of a valid claim with regard to his 
assertion that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to introduce into 
evidence the audio recording of the execution of the search warrant on the residence. 
(R., pp.5, 8-13.) As set forth in his Supporting Brief, Mr. Oser indicated several 
statements made on the tape recording would impeach the State's witnesses and 
corroborate his claim that the large ball of methamphetamine did not belong to him. 
(R., pp.11-13.) For example, according to MF. Oser, at triat Detective Berrier testified he 
did not see Mr. Williams or Mr. Johnson "ditch drugs or anything," but in the tape of the 
audio recording, the following statement is made, "There was one kid that came out. 
Both of them went out from the door. One got caught by the door. Other went back in 
the room. Only got outside for a split second. Then he comes out with empty hands. Is 
it possible he hid the coke and hid that stash?" (R., p.12.) According to Mr. Oser, there 
are other statements made in the audio the reference either Mr. Williams or 
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Mr. Johnson's throwing "an ounce of Meth" and indicating Mr. Williams was the "guy 
that brought everything." (R, p.12.) 
Thus, had Mr. Oser's trial attorney sought to admit the audio, it would have 
corroborated Mr. Oser's defense; it cannot be said that with the audio, the outcome of 
the trial would have been the same. Accordingly, Mr. Oser has raised, at the very least, 
the possibility of a valid issue with regard to his claim that his trial attorney was 
ineffective in failing to seek admission of the audio recording. As such, the district court 
erred in dismissing his Successive Petition without appointing counsel to assist 
Mr. Oser. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Oser respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his Successive Petition and remand the case for further 
proceedings with instruction that Mr. Oser be appointed counsel to assist in the post 
conviction action. 
DATED this 2ih day of January, 2012. 
ER C D. DERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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